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INTR ODUCTION

For legal scholars it is the best of times. We are inundated by an
eclectic range of writing that pushes the envelope from analysis and
synthesis to the upper reaches of theory. Mainstream topics face
fierce competition from fresh ideological visions, a variety of genres,
and spirited criticism of the status quo. Young professors have access
to a burgeoning variety of journals to circulate their ideas and advice
while the mass media covets them as public intellectuals.
There is a less sanguine mood; an increasingly vocal group of
scholars complain that it is the worst of times and refer to the above
paragraph as a proffer of proof. Eclecticism translates to postmodern
relativism in law review drama that compares, unfavorably, male
aloofness with the female nurturing instincts of "emotional logic"1 or
presents highly charged agony experiences about birthing trauma.2
Yale publishes photography as art-commentary and ramblings on
popular culture.3 Law professors as storytellers use stream of con
sciousness to circulate autobiographical tales of the racism and sexism
of the callous, liberal, white male hierarchy.4 Instead of problem
solving or providing counsel to judges and practitioners, law profes-

* Edgar A. Hahn Professor of Jurisprudence, Case Western Reserve University School
of Law. B.S. 1958, University of Virginia; LL.B. 1963, Tulane. - Ed.

1. See, e.g., Drucilla L. Cornell, The Dream Cure, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 87, 90
(1991).
2 See, e.g., Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag, Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Repro
duction" and the Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 355 {1989).

3. See Barbara Kruger, Art-Commentary, 97 YALE LJ. 1105 (1988); Symposium, Popu
lar Legal Culture, 98 YALE LJ. 1545 (1989).
4. See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
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sors write for the approval of their new peers in the humanities.5
Professors Kahn and White reside in the last category.
Ignoring the fracas and obsessed with self, professors gleefully
keep churning out the unconnected fluff and more journals surface to
absorb it, while critics seethe with frustration.6 Criticism has been en
riched with two new insights - and challenges. James Boyd White7 of
Michigan Law School seeks salvation in the use of the literary imagi
nation to transform and elevate our vision of law. Paul W. Kahn8 of
Yale Law School proffers an even more dramatic solution: stop the
presses - scholar heal thyself.
Legal scholars are, according to Kahn, like squirrels on a treadmill:
they energetically run and run but never go anywhere. We don't know
why the squirrels run, but Kahn knows what motivates legal scholars
to engage the treadmill - it's the Holy Grail of reform. Why? Re
form is always necessary. It presents the tempting challenge of an
abyss - a bottomless pit of constant failure on a highway of flawed
solutions, a road kill that attracts law professors like stink on dung
(pp. 7-8).
For Kahn, reform is the inevitable product of the interaction of
reason and will. Reason guides the rule of law with rational restraint,
analytical deliberation, and logical critique. "[W]e consent to law be
cause it is reasonable" (p. 10). But reason is an empty gesture without
popular will, which is necessary to convince the citizenry to consent to
the wisdom of reason. Most of the time this is what in fact occurs, and
the two effectively "work together to create an almost impregnable
redoubt for the rule of law as our deepest cultural commitment" (p.
13). There are, however, times where one of the institutions serves to
rationalize deficiencies in the other. For example, the lack of popular
support for a government regulation may be overcome by resort to
reason, while the irrational may be tolerated by the consent of popular
will (p. 13).
As Kahn points out, the commitment to use reason to build popu
lar will/consent prompts professors to dedicate careers to producing
reform scholarship. Much of the scholarly focus is devoted to recon5. "Too many law professors are ivory tower dilettantes, pursuing whatever subject
piques their interest, whether or not the subject merits scholarship, whether or not they have
the scholarly skills to master it." Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Le
gal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 36 (1992).
6. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Susanna Sherry, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRurH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997) ; Arthur Austin, The Top Ten Politically
Correct Law Reviews, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1319 (1994) ; Arthur Austin, The Top Ten Politi
cally Correct Law Review Articles, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 233 (1999) ; Anne M. Coughlin,
Regulating the Self: Autobiographical Performer in Outsider Scholarship, 81 VA. L. REV.
1229 (1995).
7. L. Hart Wright Professor of Law, Michigan Law School.
8. Robert W. Winner Professor of Law and the Humanities, Yale Law School.
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citing reason and will in judicial review where courts use reason to de
velop principles to "obtain the consent of the popular will" (p. 14).
Likewise, the use of reason to critique existing laws always turns up
glitches and friction, inviting suggestions of corrective reform. Kahn
sums up the source of the scholarly motivation: "The rule of law ... is
not merely rule under the existing law; it is this whole process of con
tinuous reform" (p. 15).
Juggling reason and will and a virulent addiction to reform scholar
ship is not the only problem. Instead of functioning as true scholars
with impartiality, law professors write as practitioners of reform. They
imitate judges by writing article-briefs in the doctrinal form of judicial
opinions. They seek to make law work. To Kahn, this reflects the
"collapse" of a distinction between the scholar and the object of his
study (p. 7). The scholar is in effect the judge manque. All article
briefs follow the same plot: identify a defect in an opinion's reasoning,
devise a rationale for reform, and write a new decision-article (p. 28).
The inevitable result is a continuous process of classical doctrinalism.9
It is not that Kahn completely condemns reform scholarship, but
he does argue that an obsessive interest and disquietude with the topic
diverts inquiry into more relevant areas and satisfactory results. Judge
manque scholarship gives a misleading impression that judicial deci
sions convey power. In reality, judges mainly speak to the practicali
ties of achieving an end without ever defining that end. Even the
Supreme Court cannot set an agenda for the ends of governance.
Brown v. Board of Education,10 arguably the most important judicial
decision in history, has had modest effects on society, race, and gov
ernance (p. 132). Kahn's explanation: "They never had the power;
they always lacked the will" (p. 133).
Given the existence of a multitude of complex forces that impact
and shape the compass and motivation of judicial power, scholars are
wasting time seeking "right" answers when they aren't there or are
mute. 11 Kahn's solution: shift the scholarly focus to new sources by
9. P. 19. "[Doctrinal analysis] involves the careful reading and comparison of appellate
opinions with a view to identifying ambiguities, exposing inconsistencies among cases and
lines of cases, developing distinctions, reconciling holdings, and otherwise exercising the
characteristic skills of legal analysis." Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113, 1113 (1981).
10. 3 47 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. If we are confident that we are better off after the judicial pronouncement, this is only
because we are already committed to a court-centered world in which we evaluate power by
looking to the quality of authoritative decisions. If we believe that there are right answers
under law and that law has a value in and of itself, then we will argue about the legally cor
rect answers that the Court should reach. This is what most legal scholarship is about. But if
judicial decisions do not translate into effective results in the larger political order, then legal
correctness may not be much of a value. Getting the law right may not tell us much about
the character of the political order.
P. 135.
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"looking at the legal imagination" (p. 135). Study the varied contin
gencies and the context of law's culture, its indeterminacies, and influ
ences on it from the "inheritance of remnants from antiquated belief
systems, brought into a loose coherence by virtue of certain master
conceptions- e.g., sovereignty, revolution, equality" (p. 137).
THE CULTURAL WAR

Kahn's crusade continues the law academy's paranoid relationship
with scholarship. In distancing himself from the reason-will-reform
paradigm, he implicitly acknowledges a sense of doubt as to whether
law is worthy of serious scholarship. The effort to elevate the scholar
above the "practice of law" states the source of the paranoia: the
practice of law is a vocation - something like digging ditches or
plumbing - and cannot support any attention other than descriptive
survey, that is, an explication of what lawyers do, why they do it, and
suggestions for improvement (reform).
The scholarship paranoia can be traced to Langdell's admission of
law as a vocation by his effort to create a science of law by sequencing
cases to form the basis for the deductions of legal principles. "Law,
considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines."1 2
In objectifying law he rationalized the doctrinal method of scholarship
that conforms to Kahn's paradigm - decisions are parsed and synthe
sized to derive prescriptions to guide judges and lawyers. The objec
tive is problem solving.
The dominance of doctrinalism was assured when the law review
network evolved to showcase faculty scholarship. As an editor for the
Harvard Law Review, John Henry Wigmore said: "We knew that
their pioneer work in legal education was not yet but ought to be well
appreciated by the profession. We yearned to see the fruits of their
scholarship in print."1 3 It opened up a unique system that ignores the
discipline of peer review thereby depositing virtual control over sub
stance and methodology in the author.
The first major threat to doctrinalism came from the legal realists
who questioned the credibility of the notion that "science" defines le
gal analysis. Kahn detects realism's failure as a movement in its ad
herence to the reason-will-reform paradigm, thereby remaining
"firmly within the grip of legal practice" (p. 24). Once the realist
threat dissipated, doctrinalism flourished, enabling faculty to reap fi-

12. Norman Redlich, The Common Law and the Case Method, 8 CARNEG. FOUND.
BULL. 11 {1914) (quoting Langdell).
13. John Henry Wiginore, The Recent Cases Department, 50 HARV. L. REV. 862, 862
{1937) {emphasis removed).
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nancial rewards and status from being perceived as producing a form
of scientific analysis. 1 4
In his zest to save legal scholarship from self-destruction, Kahn
conveniently opts to ignore the cultural war that engulfed legal schol
arship in the 1980s. When law school enrollment dramatically in
creased in the early '80s, it signaled more than the brain drain about
which Derek Bok complained.1 5 It provoked the hiring of a new group
of young faculty who entered the academy with a new vision. They
questioned, to the point of resentment, the rigidity and authoritarian
ism of the system that produced them. The newcomers included femi
nists who had their own score to settle. Not only did both groups
share a desire for change, they also had more in common with their
colleagues in the humanities than with the doctrinally oriented law
school faculty. They became Tenured Radicals, and as Crits (Critical
Legal Studies) and Fem Crits, they became instigators of a new cul
ture.
In the meantime, the postmodern revolution exploited its domi
nance of the humanities to gain control of the university community.
The quest for truth succumbed to relativism while emotion trumped
objectivity as the interpretation of the text became a game of trans
gressing and demystifying. Postmodern language never escapes from
its duplicity and confusion. Led by Tenured Radicals, the once
autonomous law schools joined the crusade of chaos. The values that
defined the Langdellian paradigm of scientific analysis were swept
away, leaving a dwindling group of liberal law professors, along with a
few holdouts in the sciences, to stand guard as the last keepers of the
old traditions. To make things worse, they had to fight off both
Tenured Radicals and incoming students who had been conditioned to
postmodernism in their undergraduate experiences.
Although he recognizes Critical Legal Studies' hostility to the lib
eral system, Kahn dismisses the Crits as failed reformers. They got
too radical - "[s]uch radicalness makes this scholarship seem oddly
naive" - and became irrelevant "because no one was listening" (p.
29), thus minimizing their objectives and impact. He is correct on the
failure issue, as Duncan Kennedy candidly admitted in 1995: "CLS is

14. See ARTHUR AUSTIN, THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: OUTSIDERS AND THE
STRUGGLE OVER LEGAL EDUCATION 160-64 (1998) [hereinafter AUSTIN, THE EMPIRE
STRIKES BACK]; Arthur Austin, Law Professor Salaries: The Deobjectification of Legal
Scholarship by Tenured Radicals, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 243 (1999).
15. Harvard University President Bok claimed that the "brain drain" into law schools is
"a massive diversion of exceptional talent into pursuits that often add little to the growth of
the economy, the pursuit of culture, the enhancement of the human spirit." Jethro K.
Lieberman & Tom Goldstein, Why Have Lawyers Proliferated?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1986,
atA27.
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dead as a doornail."16 Crits made a practice of drawing attention to
various problems but never followed up with solutions. As Professor
Gordon observed, after an exercise in shoveling rhetorical smoke,
Kennedy and his friends "zoom[ed] off in their BMWs and Jaguars to
continue their class struggle against hierarchy and privilege."17 The
reason they failed at reform was simple - it was never their goal. But
they did what they set out to do - wage an all-out cultural revolution
against the liberal rule of law.
It was the Crits who introduced postmodernism to the law acad
emy with a tactic now commonly known as trashing. Communicated
in a helter-skelter postmodern pitch, trashing is in-your-face jive and
chatter used to ridicule and deconstruct liberal symbols and institu
tions.18 Crits conducted a radical political campaign to break down the
law academy's infrastructure of objectivity, neutrality, and rationality
- and ultimately subvert the individualistic, biased rule of law. The
liberal, constructed hierarchy would be replaced by egalitarian altru
ism.19
The Crit manifesto, Roll Over Beethoven,'2.o stands as one of the
first - and most passionate - expressions of postmodern legal schol
arship. Peter Gabel and Duncan Kennedy, two of the original Crits,
engage in a Critspeak hip-hop session of ridicule, contempt, and radi
cal chic. Kennedy praises the interspace of artifacts, gestures, histri
onics, soap opera, pop culture, and "all that kind of stuff."21 Gabel
opines: "That I think is indeterminate."22 The masters of crittrash are,
however, coherent on one point. They criticize the reform efforts of
liberals and feminists, labeling them hallucinates who co-opt them
selves into "adopting the very consciousness they want to transform."23
Their target is the State - "the state as a collective hallucination."24
They complain about the reciprocity among people, unconnectedness,
16. Hope Yen, A s HLS Mulls Its Mission,
Dec. 1, 1995, at 2.
17. James Gordon,
(1991).

CLS Scholars Remain Quiet, HARV. L. REC.,

Law Review and the Modem Mind,

33

ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 269

18. "Take specific arguments very seriously in their own terms; discover they are actu
ally foolish ( [tragi]-comic); and then look for some (external observer's) order (not a germ of
truth) in the internally contradictory, incoherent chaos we've exposed." Mark G. Kelman,
Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 293 (1984).
19. "Altruism enjoins us to make sacrifices, to share, and to be merciful. It has roots in
culture, in religion, ethics and art, that are as deep as those of individualism. (Love thy
neighbor as thyself.)" Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1717 (1976).
20. Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
21. Id. at 9.
22

Id.

23.

Id. at26.

at 53.

24. Id. at28.
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and the State as an imaginary political community composed of a "se
quence of images forming a kind of dream-like narrative that mystifies
and idealizes the painful reality of immediate social experience - the
real experience corroded by alienation and mutual distance."25
Kahn also views the feminist movement as reformist and, like CLS,
as "in thrall to the idea that reason and will are the double sources of
the rule of law" (p.24). There is no doubt that feminists talk a rights
game, and it was the Crit's refusal to support their reform aspirations
that led to a break between the groups - with the Crits the losers.26
But that was before the postmodern vision had the opportunity to be
come a major factor in revising feminist rhetoric. Equality by itself is
not sufficient to root out the residual effects of patriarchy and the tyr
anny of reason. What is needed, according to many contemporary
feminists, is a postmodern worldview of reality as a mask for the unor
dered and holistic solutions that come from feeling and empathy.27
A postmodern dialect enables female legal scholars to produce
shock trashing to discredit and break down the coherence of the con
structed categories and classifications used by the dominant legal ide
ology to oppress women. Fictional social constructions, like male,
female, heterosexual, homosexual, and lesbian, in actuality blur into a
continuum. In her controversial postmodern declaration, Mary Joe
Frug described in graphic detail the female body existing in a state of
constant terror, shocked the readers with the "F" and "C" words,
while praising postmodernism for encouraging "wordplay that is often
dazzlingly funny, smart, and irreverent. Things aren't just what they
seem"28
; that is, things aren't what they seem in a liberal, politically
constructed, dominant culture.
The most energetic opposition to the culture of reason comes from
the "voice"movement. As females and people of color, writers in this
tradition voice the unique and distinct perceptions and experiences of
outsiders coping with liberal majoritarian law. Voice people challenge
doctrinalism with a new paradigm; they use narratives, parodies, and
parables to produce authentic and exclusive accounts of alienation and
victimhood.29
25.

Id.

at 35.

26. See Robin West, Deconstructing the CLS-Fem Split, 2 WIS. WOMEN'S LJ. 85 (1 986);
AUSTIN, THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK, supra note 14, at 92-93 .
27. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1 982) ; Symposium, Women in
Legal Education-Pedagogy, Law, Theory, and Practice, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1988).
28. Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105
HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1047 {1992).
29. The dominant view is summed up by a critic of authenticity: "[The] voice of color is
identified and synonymous with marginalized groups in our society whose marginal outsider
status enables them to relate important stories - stories that cannot be sincerely told by
their privileged majoritarian peers." Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100
YALE L.J. 2007, 2038 {1991).
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Voice comes to the table with formidable leverage. It is marketed
as a Kuhnian paradigm change, a new genre of scholarship vetting
race and gender. 30 The race and gender orientation tends to mute
negative responses. Moreover, the biographical context of narrative
stories makes them virtually immune to critical evaluation. 31 Negative
criticism merely validates the authenticity of the author's description
of victimization. "How can you respond critically? Tell a different
story of your own?" 32 Finally, by converting truth into whatever the
author decrees, storytelling introduces into legal scholarship a post
modern self that defies consensus. 33
While the voice medium delivers a message, it is not the message.
The message of Critical Race Theory scholarship is that the. liberal,
white, male rule of law and the system it maintains are corrupt. This
system is an institution predicated on white supremacy, immune to re
form, and destined for catastrophe. Derrick Bell uses the voice thesis
in a parable about an economically besieged United States accepting
an offer from aliens to exchange Blacks for gold and critical chemi
cals. 34 In another Bell allegory, it takes an explosion killing all Black
faculty and administration at Harvard to force an affirmative action
hiring policy. 35 Even when the white system makes a concession, it
will invariably tum out to be a trick to camouflage some new form of
oppression. While Patricia Williams tells stories about persevering in
a racist society, 36 Richard Delgado's narratives blame Western men-

30. See Arthur Austin, Evaluating
74 NEB. L. REV. 479, 492-96 (1995).

Storytelling as a Type of Nontraditional Scholarship,

31. Indeed, some advocates of storytelling come close to suggesting that silence is the only
permissible response to stories. Whites who sympathetically· attempt to analyze or even re
count stories told by people of color are said to be guilty of misappropriating the storyteller's
pain. For example, when a white woman at a CLS summer camp referred to a story told by
a Native Canadian woman as an example to defend the us·e of personal experiences, the
original storyteller protested: 'Did that woman intend to appropriate my pain for her own
use, stealing my very existence, as so many other White, well-meaning, middle and upper
class feminists have done?'

A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Nar
ratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 851, n.233 (1993) (citations omitted).

Daniel

32. David Sexton, Radio Review:
TELEGRAPH, Mar. 2, 1997, at 31.

Should We Be Blind or Not, Prof?, LONDON

33. See STEVEN CONNOR, POSTMODERNIST CULTURE:
THEORIES OF THE CONTEMPORARY 10 (1989).

AN INTRODUCTION TO

34. "And just as the forced importation of those African ancestors had made the na
tion's wealth and productivity possible, so their forced exodus saved the country from the
need to pay the price of its greed-based excess." Derrick Bell, After We're Gone: Prudent
Speculation on America in a Post-Racial Epoch, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 393, 400 (1990).
35. See Derrick Bell, The
MICH. L. REV. 2382 (1989).
36.

Final Report: Harvard's Affirmative Action Allegory,

See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
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tality for unleashing "a ruthless, restless culture"37 that enslaves people
of color.
To Kahn, reform means superficial tinkering - revising process
and procedure, courts expanding or contracting rights as professors
gleefully and self-righteously chum out critique scholarship. While
the Crits cravenly demurred from the revolution, the Tenured
Radicals of feminism and the voice people participated in rights advo
cacy, but only as a support tactic for their main objective - a para
digm change from the liberal culture of reason and rationality to the
indeterminacy of the postmodern culture. Like Kahn, they seek a new
culture. Unlike Kahn, they are in the process of achieving their goal.
KAHN AS A P OSTMODERNIST

Kahn's evasion of the postmodern paradigm change challenge is
explained when he outlines his cultural study of law. His creation of
what I call the Ideal Legal Scholar avoids contamination from the
practice of law by engaging in a Socratic dialogue that enables him to
temporarily suspend belief in law practice. By transcending "every
context" of the practice of law, the scholar is free "to examine the
conditions of belief that make possible our ordinary activities and
norms" (p. 33), enabling him to discover postmodern insights: imagi
nation prevails over reason, law is always contingent, 38 avoid making
normative judgments, and seek out self so "[w]e can know more about
ourselves" (p. 40).
As the central nervous system of certainty, truth is anathema to
postmodernism. 39 In assuming that truth interferes with the work of
the Ideal Scholar in his cultural inquiry, Kahn implicitly endorses
postmodernism. To the Ideal Scholar, truth is inevitably qualified and
contested, existing as an attitude or the product of imagination. "Like
every constructed world, the critical world exists only as long as we
imagine it"(p. 40).
A rejection of truth and certainty does not inhibit Kahn from giv
ing the Ideal Scholar a detailed macromap for the cultural survey. The
map calls for the use of what Kahn calls "genealogy" and "architec37. See Richard Delgado,
review).

Rodrigo's Chronicle,

101

YALE L.J.

1357, 1370 (1992) (book

38. "Understanding the constructed character of the rule of law allows us to see its con
tingent character and to understand that law's claim upon us is not a product of law's truth
but of our own imagination - our imagining its meanings and our failure to imagine alterna
tives." P. 39.
39. What is striking is precisely the degree of consensus in postmodernist discourse that
there is no longer any possibility of consensus, the authoritative announcements of the dis
appearance of final authority and the promotion and recirculation of a total and comprehen
sive narrative of a cultural condition in which totality is no longer thinkable.

CONNOR, supra note 33, at 10.
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ture" to uncover a "legal aesthetic" (pp. 40-41). Genealogy traces the
remnants - implications - of cultural transitions, to etch out a narra
tive of beliefs. Architecture relies on analogy to show that in law the
past always exists in the present. "The point of legal interpretation is
always to recover, i.e., to make present, something that appears al
ready to exist" (p. 52). Unlike science, in which progress destroys the
past, in law nothing is ever displaced. "All law remains available at
every moment" (p. 54).
By giving the past continuity, Kahn compels the Ideal Scholar to
consider the consequences of relevant transitions, especially those as
sociated with religion and revolution. Pass a law, lock someone in jail,
or write a brief, and it resonates with the authority of Moses descend
ing from the Mount with God's law. Law "is simultaneously a product
and a continuing representation of the divine origins of the commu
nity" (p. 47). Revolution breaks out, law ends, but "[w]ithout revolu
tion, law does not begin" (p. 69), as each validates the other.
Pondering the indeterminacy of religion and conjecturing over the
remnants of political transitions provide the perfect pursuit for the
postmodern scholar.
Law as imagination and fiction have a
Derridaian bite that resonates in the gamesmanship ploys of the fac
ulty lounge. But Kahn leaves postmodern abstractions to micro
manage and in the process puts his Ideal Scholar in an awkward bind.
According to Kahn, every institution can make representation
claims, often leading to multiple or competing claims. For example,
both judge and jury can claim to represent the popular sovereign,
forcing what Kahn calls a "contest" with enormous implications. If
the jury is speaking for the people as representative of the popular
sovereign, jury nullification would "appear permissible because it is
understood as a direct action by the people" (p. 80). But if it is the
court that can claim sovereign representation, nullification would con
stitute an inappropriate usurpation of power. "The judge can claim to
know the law and, through law, to know the sovereign people better
than any accidental collection of persons on a jury" (p. 80).
At this point the Ideal Scholar faces a dilemma. Bound by Kahn's
ukase to avoid the trenches of reform, the Scholar's work is at an end.
He has identified the intersection between the institutions and the
competing representation claims but can do no more than note their
contingent existence; he cannot, as a postmodernist, make a judgment
on a "correct" claim of representation, but instead, he "explores the
multiple possibilities of representational claims" (p. 78). Here is the
dilemma. Stopping at this point is a counterintuitive inhibition for se
rious scholars: it cuts against the moral obligation, inherent in the
scholarly ethic, to carry inquiry to a conclusion - whatever the conse
quences. Ironically, Kahn illustrates the dilemma by being unable to
refrain from making a judgment: while jury nullification is generally
"flawed justice," it may be appropriate in certain situations, such as
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charges of euthanasia (p. 81). Kahn's relativistic cultural analysis col
lapses.
The explanation for Kahn's vigorous stand for cultural scholarship
comes in four "methodological rules" whose intent is to render practi
cal scholarship either superfluous or officious. The rules come in two
strands: first, every meaning in law is contingent. Even the source of
power, the judge, exists as a contingency- either as a suppressed self
in which he conveys a rule of law image, or, in the alternative, sup
pressing the law image to become a political figure (e.g. Chief Justice
Earl Warren) (p.. 101). . In law, progress is a myth, and there are no
successes or failures, resulting in persistent competition among mean
ings. Reform under these conditions is thus a meaningless ephem
eron. "In the absence of a hierarchy of norms, no program of reform
can silence alternatives" (p. 104).
Secondly, law is not "a failed form of something other than itself"
(p. 92), and it is not something in transition. "[L]aw is a set of mean
ings by which we live - and that is all that it is" (p. 102). Practical
scholars like Richard Posner can effect a type of change that never
impacts on the rule of law - which existed before and will exist after
Posner's reform. Moreover, debates among practical scholars result in
"balancing" and political compromises internal to the rule of law. The
failure or success of the reform does not affect the nation's faith in
law's rule, "which dates from the founding" (p. 105).
Kahn says that he does not seek the demise of reform scholarship
- instead he suggests the use of some restraint to tone down the
rhetoric and expectations. Nor should the Ideal Scholar subvert the
practical work of traditional scholarship (p. 137). These protestations
cannot smokescreen his contempt for the practical scholar's waste of
energy on unproductive goals. Arguing about the interplay of reason
and will and how the authoritative sovereign should govern detours
the practical scholar to spurious claims on the authority and power of
the judiciary, wasting resources best devoted to "the character of the
study of law" (p. 135). Kahn cautions that, while courts can tell us
which side of the road to drive on, they do not have the authority to
affect the vital factors of governance. "Courts can draw our attention
to the aberrational, i.e., to remnants of social practices that we have
otherwise abandoned, but they cannot make us other than we are" (p.
130). Dedication to reform analysis hides the reality that courts have
marginal effect on societal outcomes.
Kahn's message is that writing about what should be done and ar
guing over which Justice's opinion is "correct" may be a self-serving
path to academic status but is a waste of time for discovering the im
plications of legal culture. He wants the Ideal Scholar to follow the
cultural inquiry to the source of "real power" that "inheres in our ex
pectations and beliefs, in the institutional structures that we take for
granted, and in countless, mundane daily choices" (p. 132). The objec-
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tive: redefine and reorient the character of the study of law by exam
ining the legal imagination, a concept that covers the full range of ex
periences such as the impact of sexuality and the implication of the
body. "The cultural study of law investigates a way of life in all its di
versity, not just those objects and practices positively labeled 'law' "
(p. 125).
Kahn leaves no doubt that it is a religious meaning that inspires the
imagination of the Ideal Scholar. Even violence can be understood by
reference to religion. To connect law and violence, one must under
stand that sacrifice is an act of violence that transforms ideas into re
ality. Kahn cites Abraham's sacrifice of his only son Isaac in exchange
for a nation under law (p. 95). Where there is no divine response, sac
rifice is meaningless violence. Kahn's cultural inquiry demonstrates
that violence can best be understood as a meaningful factor in the le
gal imagination - not as an act of failure or a mistake implying "that
somehow we have a world that we did not intend to have" (p. 97).
LAW AND LITERATURE

"To understand the rule of law we must examine that which we
imagine to be other than law" (Kahn, p. 120).
"A cultural approach sees that all of law's texts, including those of
the legal scholar, are works offiction" (Kahn, p. 139).
Kahn is preaching a version of postmodernism to a sympathetic
audience of feminists, critical race people, and Tenured Radicals. He
can also count on support from elements of the law and literature
group. While Kahn correctly characterizes law and banana efforts 4 0
(for example, law and psychology, sociology, economics, etc.) as "se
curely within the practice of law, regardless of their letterhead" (p.
26), the literature movement has diverse letterheads, along with an
eclectic range of uses and effects, including Professor White's use of
literature to postmodernize law. Using "good" literature to teach
writing skills obviously comes under a law practice characterization
called remedial education. We get a blurred letterhead from an ex
atnination
of
.
William Faulkner's Intruder in the Dust,41 which discloses multiple
meanings on the intersection of race, violence, maturation, and law.4 2
There is no blurring of meaning or intention, however, when Robin

40. "Virtually all the leading law schools offer what detractors call 'law and banana
courses' like 'Ethology of Law' at Yale, 'Rhetoric, Law, and Culture' at Michigan, 'Anthro
pology of Law' at Columbia and 'Law and Economics' almost everywhere." Charles
Rothfeld, What Do Law Schools Teach? Almost Anything, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1988, at BS.
41.

WILLIAM FAULKNER, INTRUDER IN THE DUST (1948).

42

See "The Law and Southern Literature" Symposium, 4 MISS. C, L. REV. 165 (1984).

Michigan Law Review

1516

[Vol. 98:1504

West uses a Franz Kafka short story, A Hunger Artist,43 to trash Rich
ard Posner's world of economic individualism. By selling admission to
people to witness him starving to death, the Hunger Artist is the "ul
timate Posnerian entrepreneur,"4 4 dedicated to the corrupting indi
vidualism of a capitalist market economy. West interprets the story to
depict a Posnerian system that "leaves all preferences satiated at every
moment of autonomous choice"4 5 and refuses to intervene in social
and economic dislocations.
Posner disputes the accuracy of West's interpretation of Kafka,46
thereby missing the point. It is not a matter of interpretative transla
tion; West incorporates Kahn's notion of "other than law" and culture
as "fiction" to derive a description of the oppressive effects of an eco
nomic system driven to solve every problem - from adoption to vio
lence - by resort to free market exchange. West's pretension thus
demonstrates the affinity between Kahn's culture of imagination and
the use of literature to explicate. While literature has always inter
acted with law, it has generally been as background presence. Years
ago, for example, it was common practice to provide incoming stu
dents with a list of "recommended" literary icons that would present
insights into the profession. In the postmodern era, law and literature
has become a featured attraction.47 Teaching Virginia Wolfe, Dick
Gregory, and Marcel Proust gave Tenured Radicals an opportunity to
demonstrate disdain for objectivity, try new critical theories, and of
fend the Kingsfields of the Academy. More literature courses were
added to respond to demands for exposure to feminist work. What
ever the motivating currents, the movement bears the imprint of
James Boyd White, who got things going in The Legal Imagination
(1973)48 and now sums up in From Expectation to Experience.
Professor White has been conducting a cultural inquiry of his own,
anticipating Kahn's scorn for "practical law" by vehemently rejecting
the use of literature for vocational purposes. White's Ideal Reader
43. FRANZ KAFKA, A Hunger Artist, in SELECTED STORIES OF FRANZ KAFKA 188 (Willa
Muir & Edwin Muir eds., Random House 1952).
44. Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral
and Political Visions ofFranz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384, 393 (1985).
45.

Id.

at 394.

46. Posner's response: It [A Hunger Artist] may be about many things. But only super
ficially is it about hunger, poverty, the pitfalls of entrepreneurship, and the fickleness of con
sumers." RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION
180·81 (1988).
"

47. In a 1993-94 survey of 199 law schools, 84 reported offering law and literature
courses. Elizabeth Villiers Gemmette, Law and Literature: Joining the Class Action, 29
VAL. U. L. REV. 665, 666 (1995).
48. JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF
LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION 311-14 (1 973) [hereinafter WHITE,
LEGAL
,
IMAGINATION] .
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does not read literature to fact monger, to gain clues to character, or
to learn methods of critical interpretation. Likewise, White rejects lit
erature as constituting a road map to rhetorical flourishes and strata
gems for getting an edge in litigation. Instead, the Ideal Reader en
gages the text "to transform one's sense of language, of the mind, and
of the world" (p. 56). The objective is to exploit the power of reading
in a performance that enables us to recognize experiences beyond self.
What the habitual reading of literature offers, then, is not a set of propo
sitions or a method leading to a set of results, but the experience of di
recting one's attention to a plane or dimension of reality that is noJ1l1ally
difficult or impossible to focus upon, namely the ethical and linguistic
plane, where we remake in our texts both our languages and ourselves.
To the literary mind language is not simply transparent, a way of talking
about objects or concepts in the world, but is itself a part of the world;
language is not simply an instrument that "I" use in communicating ideas
to "you" but a way in which I am, or make myself, in relation to you. [p.

71]
Kahn wants to rehabilitate the legal scholar through imagination of
self and other in conceiving the rule of law; White wants to rehabili
tate the law student through exposure to the literary imagination, ul
timately transforming the student into an Ideal Reader with the in
stincts of an Ideal Scholar. He begins by having students examine
nonlegal texts to identify voices and discourse that legal expressions
omit. The next step is to learn - and appreciate - how nonlegal
authors transform language. Then comes a critical internal dialogue; a
student is ordered to conjure up an experience such as the death of a
friend, the character of another person, regulation of conduct, and
"think" about it, first as a lawyer, and then "in some other way avail
able to her, as she might do in the rest of life" (p. 74). In the ensuing
dialogue, a comparison emerges in which the law discourse comes
across as artificial, lifeless, and packed with objectified, analytical ri
gidity.
White initially assumed that the comparison would compel the
student to begin to doubt his choice of law as a career and, as a coun
ter, to develop a creative alternative to the law voice. That is not what
happened - instead students relied on the voice they had successfully
used in undergraduate school, a voice as vacuous as lawspeak. The re
sult is frustration: "[T]he student finds himself using two voices, both
of which are unsatisfactory to him" (p. 75).
The remedy for this face-off is literary imagination. Using the en
ergy from literature, students learn to speak in a new voice that en
ables them to produce more inspired law work as well as discoursing
in a personal voice of their own. They become Ideal Readers. The
power of nonlegal voices informs the student, "establishing possibili
ties to admire, or in some cases deplore, that may help us investigate
how this life can be led well" (p. 78).
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White describes a postmodern version of basic training: take
young, na'ive recruits, pound into their pliable psyches how futile their
pitiable existence as civilians was, then inculcate them with the combat
techniques of a more fulfilling life. Like my old top sergeant who
opened up every day by looking me up and down before advising me
that "if that's ed-a-cation, I don't want none of it" (he was the best
professor I've ever had), White seeks to convince law students that
lawspeak is unworthy, stunted, and that they are in need of redemp
tion through literature. Darkness at Noon49 comes to law school.
In a typical drill session from The Legal Imagination, White orders
the student recruits to read an excerpt from The Education of Henry
Adams,50 reminds them of Joseph Conrad's quitting the sea to become
a writer - "Why on earth did he do so . . . ?," asks a series of ques
tions, orders them to "express the real you," "[t]hink now of your rela
tions with others," "[c]onsider what you do when a friend suffers,"5 1
and on and on. The message is clear: develop a voice of empathy and
compassion or remain condemned to lawspeak.
Even in the congenial milieu of a writer's workshop or the speciali
zation of an English major, the conversion White seeks is problematic.
Acquiring the temperament or self that he envisions involves a per
sonal journey, demanding serious maturation and considerable sacri
fice. As an undergraduate I took over thirty hours of lit courses and
never encountered the type of highly progr ammed badgering that
White throws at his students. I experienced passion rather then pro
gramming. If I accessed a new voice, it did not come from classroom
badgering but from the opportunity to hear William Faulkner discuss
the creative process. 5 2 He was "a tricky man, not above playing, how
ever courteously, with his audience,"5 3but he was open to the creative
process. There is another problem: White eschews the use of litera
ture to teach style yet promotes a drill program force-feeding students
with demands for copious drafts, conveying the message that style is in
fact the objective - why else engage in the ennui of drafting exer
cises?

49. ARTHUR KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT NOON (Daphne Hardy trans., MacMillan Co.
1941) {1940).
50. HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS:
(Houghton Mifflin Sentry ed., 8th prtg. 1961) (1918).

AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY

51. WHITE, LEGAL IMAGINATION, supra note 48, at 311-14.
52 See FAULKNER IN THE UNIVERSITY: CLASS CONFERENCES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
VIRGINIA (Frederick L. Gwynn & Joseph L. Blotner eds., 1959).
53. See Douglas Day, Introduction to FAULKNER IN THE UNIVERSITY xi {Frederick L.
Gwynn & Joseph L. Blotner eds., 1959).
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POSNER V. WHITE: PARADISE L OST- OR GAINED?
The harshest criticism of White's work comes from Judge Richard
Posner, who first raised the issue of relevance in a law review article s4
followed by a book.ss He rejects the assumption that literature can
furnish unique insights into law or that lawyers, as lawyers, can con
tribute to the understanding of literature. Literature may reference
law, but law is not the central story. "There are better places to learn
about law than novels .... "s6 Moreover, White's literary musing re
flects nonlegal interest and training, not legal skills. .Posner debunks
what he calls the "great false hope": that literature can inform lawyers
about interpretative knowledge, which can help in extracting meaning
from text. To Posner, the great false hope masks a post-structuralist
ploy that would equate legal interpretation with a system of literary
interpretation that replaces the author's authority over meaning with
the authority of reader-critics. "[T]he readers have now overthrown
the bosses and installed themselves in power."s7 Without the direction
of the author's intention, reader-critics have total control over mean
ing, leading to a system where there can be as many "correct" inter
pretations as reader-critics. Posner's distinction is that literary people
can get away with poetic license but not judges who have the respon
sibility to impose their will on the public. Posner concludes: "the
functions of legislation and literature are so different, and the objec
tives of the readers of these two different sorts of mental product so
divergent, that the principles and approaches developed for the one
have no useful application to the other."ss
If literary imagination becomes the springboard for legal interpre
tation, it is Paradise Lost for Posner and his liberal colleagues. His
1986 article described an interpretative attitude that defined the then
dominant liberal tradition.s9 If he had put his ear to the railroad
tracks, he would have heard ominous vibrations. Postmodernism was
beginning to filter into the law academy, filling a leadership void left
by disconnected and aloof liberals who were blind to, or intimidated
by, the aggressive tactics of Tenured Radicals. The Radicals consti
tute a group of people who, as the Yale Law School dean said, care
more about the humanities than law.60 By the early 1990s the post-·

54. Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351
(1986).
55. POSNER, supra note 46.
56. Posner, supra note 54, at 1356.
57. TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 85 {1983).
58. Posner, supra note 54, at 1374.
59. See generally id.
60. Former Dean Wellington was credited with the complaint that "law professors today
are more concerned with intellectual currents among their colleagues in the arts and sciences
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modem influence had infiltrated the American Association of Law
Schools, which decreed "nontraditional" (read postmodern) scholar
ship acceptable for promotion and tenure. 16 But give Posner credit for
ferreting out what White and the postmodernist were after - the use
of the literary imagination to distill objectivity and the Posnerian eco
nomic model from law.
Two years after Posner's book came out, White pounced like an
offended Norman Mailer going after Gore Vidal . He started by can
didly acknowledging, "I agree with virtually nothing that is said . . . . "62
He accused Posner of a hidden agenda; what is offered as an examina
tion of literature is in reality a Langdellian legal brief stacked with co
ercive arguments and propositions that fail to "engage" (one of
White's favorite words) the texts he seeks to explain. 63 Compiling
facts and identifying issues, Posner treats texts as if they were legal
precedent. He gets the ultimate put-down - he is an anti-intellectual
who speaks in an academic-lawyer-economist voice that "prevents him
from seeing in the texts he studies the most important part of their
meaning."64 Posner is not an Ideal Reader.
White's main criticism is that Posner suffers from an inability to
"engage" - or connect - to text and that that is a deficiency that
compels him to force the judgment that literature has nothing to say
about extracting meaning from authoritative legal texts. 65 Othenvise
he could divine the message that uncovering original intention is nei
ther linear nor a function of marginal cost but comes from the use of
the literary imagination - it is, in other words, an art. 6 6 From expec
tation to experience, White invokes the translator's analogy: every
textual translation adds something that was not in the original or omits
something that was. To demonstrate how the translation process
works, White has students translate "All men are created equal"into a

and less concerned about law practice and the output of the bench." John C. Metaxas, Two
Justices, Self-Congratulation Mark Harvard Anniversary Bash, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 22, 1986, at
4. He subsequently wrote that they "do not venture outside the ivy-covered walls, scorn the
practicing lawyer and his work . . . and look for rewards only from within the universities."
Harry Wellington, Challenges to Legal Education: The "Two Cultures" Phenomenon, 37 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 327, 329 (1987).

61. In making promotion and tenure decisions faculty are to avoid "prejudice against
any particular methodology or perspective used in teaching or scholarship." Report of the
AALS Special Committee on Tenure and the Tenuring Process, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 477, 505
(1992) .
62. James Boyd White, What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature?, 102 HARV. L. REV.
2014, 2014 (1989) (reviewing POSNER, supra note 46).
63. See id. at 2028.
64. Id. at 2015.
65. See id. at 2015 (noting that "Posner does not treat literature as literature . . "); id. at
2033 ("Posner tends to look right through the language of the texts he reads . . ."); see also
id. at 2021-22.
.

.

66. See id. at 2023.
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foreign language of their choice. "The results are astonishing: in
some languages, such as Korean or Chinese, my students report that
the sentence they produce is simply incoherent or unintelligible" (p.
85).
The analogy is that the lawyer-artist, in reading the authoritative
text to extract a meaning for application in a new context, will neces
sarily add and omit.67 The ascertainment of a static and immutable
original meaning is, under the translator's analogy, impossible and a
dangerous assumption. This does not mean, as Posner argues, that the
lawyer-artist is empowered with the unbridled discretion to pick
meaning out of the air with Derridaian insouciance. The lawyer-artist
is always restrained by an obligation of fidelity to the original text.
"The lawyer is thus a kind of translator, a writer who necessarily re
makes an original text but always under the obligation to do it jus
tice. "68
Postmodernism endorses language lacunae: obscurantism to mask
substantive confusion or vacuity.69 Posner complained that he had dif
ficulty following White's exhortative abstract discourse.70 Unques
tionably White has an affinity for language lacunae - in part attribut
able to the material in which he trades. He is essentially an English
professor who crusades in the law academy and understandably lapses
into rhetorical enrichment deemed fashionable in an English depart
ment. Then too, like Kahn, he is a postmodernist, and that's how they
talk. The problem for outsiders is cutting through the rhetorical
stratagems to ascertain if there is a hidden agenda.
White's translator analogy requires some serious cutting. He uses
the analogy to demonstrate that intentionalism is a sham because
original intent defies identification. While translation produces "a
kind of relativism" (p. 84), White claims that it never dissolves into
deconstruction. The "good lawyer" and the "good judge," who pro
duce the ideal interpretation for a given context, can bypass the abyss
of deconstruction (p. 85), where there is no fixed meaning of a text,
67. See id. at 2021.
68. Id. at 2022 (footnote omitted).
69. Critic Raymond Tallis says: "clarity is the enemy of writers whose stylistic manner
isms serve to cover over difficult theoretical problems by making [it] hard to pin down just
what they are saying." Raymond Tallis, A Cure for Theorrhea, 3 CRITICAL REV. 7, 29
(1989) (book review). John Ellis identifies another consequence of obscurantist terrorism it deflects criticism "so that familiar positions may not seem so familiar and otherwise obvi
ously relevant scholarship may not seem so obviously relevant." JOHN M. ELLIS, AGAINST
DECONSTRUCTION 142 (1989).
70. See Posner, supra note 54, at 1392 ("[White's] writings on law and literature contain
much on literature, but little on law beyond exhortation to lawyers and judges to be more
sensitive, candid, empathetic, imaginative, and humane. The exhortation is timely and elo
quent; but what exactly White envisages for law as a humanity I do not know. His most re
cent effort to explain what he means is pitched at so high a level of abstraction that I have
lost the thread of his discourse.").
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except in the experience of the reader "and that experience is immedi
ately compromised the moment you say something about it."71

In a search for the ideal interpretation, how does the "good judge"
overcome the relativism of the translator's analogy? Easy : he engages
in "a perpetual negotiation between the self and the world, including
other people" (p. 87), learns what they say or do, looks to other lan
guages, values, and cultures, while comparing the judge's own lan
guage with others. It is like reading an Alan Greenspan transcript;
you know he is making a point, but you're not sure what it is. Like
Greenspan usually does, White reveals the point at the end : "There
are no right answers here, but a conversation all the terms of which
are tentative or uncertain" (p. 87). Here is the hidden agenda : the
"good judge" and the "good lawyer" are, in fact, contrary to White's
assertions, engaging in deconstruction. Like Paul de Man, the "good
judge" knows that language never escapes "from the duplicity, the
confusion, the untruth that we take for granted in the everyday use of
language. "72
Professor Kahn tells us, "The power of irony extends everywhere"
(p. 76), presumably even touching White, Paul de Man, and decon
struction. White rejects deconstruction for going too far by denying
the possibility of any meaning. 37 He exaggerates the range of decon
struction; meaning exists but only for an instant, it is constantly de
fined and refined, never finalized, and always subject to the trace of
previous and subsequent words.74 For the literary critic there is a more
compelling reason for staying away from deconstruction - it is de
classe. Once the chic literary - and law 57 - fashion, it self-destructed
from the excesses of Jacques Derrida, 7 6 the debacle of the Fish Bowl at
Duke, 7 7 and the Paul de Man scandal.78
71. STANLEY FISH, IS1HERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 65 {1980).
72. PAUL DE MAN, Criticism and Crisis, in BLINDNESS AND INSIGHT: EsSAYS IN THE
RHETORIC OF CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM 3, 9 (1971).
73. See White, supra note 62, at2017 n.8.
74. See Arthur Austin, A -Primer on Deem1:Jt111etio11's "Rhapsody of Word-Plays", 71
N.C. L. REV.201,205-6 (1992).
75. A state supreme court judge advertised for clerks who could apply "deconstruction
ist textual theory to workers' compensation statutes and Article 9 of the U.C.C." David
Margolick, At the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1991, at Al2.
76. "[F]or readers with a lifetime to spare, there is also a 100-page essay by Jacques
Derrida, dealing with a subject yet to be determined." WILLIAM E. CAIN, THE CRISIS IN
CRITICISM: 1HEORY, LITERATURE, AND REFORM IN ENGLISH STUDIES 167 (1984).
77. Stanley Fish transformed a mediocre English department into a national fashion
plate by hiring stars in postmodern fields like deconstruction. It became the cutting-edge of
literary criticism. After intense political infighting, it self-destructed. See David Yaffe, The
Department that Fell to Earth, LINGUA FRANCA, Feb. 1999, at24.
78. Three years after his death, de Man was exposed as a Nazi collaborationist and
propagandist, having published more than 170 anti-Semitic articles. See AUSTIN, supra note
14, at 106-09.
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The irony is that the rumors of its demise put up a smokescreen for
deconstruction's current revival under postmodernism. The aphro
disiac high from telling Homer and Shakespeare what they meant
proved too much as postmodernists searched for new ways to retain
control of the text. And what better strategy than to use literature as a
vehicle to showcase legal texts as vulnerable to the interpretative in
clinations of the Ideal Reader? It reminds me of the time I heard
William Faulkner tell a graduate English student - an Ideal Reader
- who was badgering him about the character implications of Flem
Snopes that, if that's what the student got out of Flem, that was O.K.
with him.79 Faulkner was not about to get into an argument over what
he - the author - meant to say about one of his creations.
Both Kahn and White vehemently urge the absence of correct in
terpretation - truth is invariably contingent, incorporating traces of
the past and future. "The idea," White says, "is to undermine the as
sumption that words 'have' meanings, and suggest instead that they
have potential for. meanings of many kinds."80 White's translation
analogy automatically generates static - meanings omitted or added
- that renders interpretation problematic. The designation of a
"good lawyer" and a "good judge" with commitments to "justice" is an
open-ended invitation for context-dictated value judgement, and is
subject to Posner's wrath for cutting "himself loose from moorings
that are part of the fundamental design of American government."81

EDWARDS VS. WIDTE
First came the postmodernistic scholarship - then came the criti
cal reaction. The most dramatic criticism came from Judge Harry T.
Edwards of the D.C. Court of Appeals and former Michigan law pro
fessor who got the academy's attention by charging that professors at
elite schools were imitating the arts and sciences with rogue scholar
ship.82 He labeled them ivy tower dilettantes who, as " 'impractical'
scholars,"83 produce abstract theory unconnected to law. With a dedi
cation to indeterminacy, Critical Legal Studies falls in the impractical
category, while law and economics, with flights in abstraction, exem-

79. This was part of a conversation that I overheard in an English class at the University
of Virginia in 1958. I like to think that Faulkner would have agreed with me that there is a
lot of Flem in Bill Clinton. See Arthur Austin, From Flem Snopes to Bill Clinton Somehow
We've Been Here Before, WASH. TIMEs, Sept. 7, 1998, Fair Comment, at 30.
80. P. 79. White sounds like Stanley Fish: "The objectivity of the text is an illusion and
moreover, a dangerous illusion, because it is so physically convincing." FISH, supra note 71,
at 43.
81. See Posner, supra note 54, at 1370.
82. See Edwards, supra note 5.
83. Id. at 35.
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plifies the irrelevance of theory. As for law and literature, Edwards
tosses it aside as making no practical contribution - it "simply de
scribes certain texts."84
With indignant flair, the Judge took the debate to a different
venue; while Posner focused his criticisms on literature, Edwards in
dicted the spread of the postmodern culture into legal education and even into practice. It was a venue that gave White an opportunity
to reprint an article presenting a richer and more encompassing justifi
cation for his literary imagination (pp. 43-51 ).
According to White, scholarship is more complicated than
Edwards's misleading dichotomy between the practical and the theo
retical. White contends that everything starts with the law school mis
sion, which should not teach task assigning, present "right" or
"wrong" choices, or burden students with the acquisition of skills. The
objective is expansion: learning one's mode of thought, engaging in
self-criticism, and making choices "under conditions of radical uncer
tainty" (p. 47). It is a matter of translating from other fields, testing
the language of one field against that of another. The mission is to
teach "responsibility for the operations of one's own mind" (p. 47).
White thus "engages" Edwards by converting his complaint against
scholar dilettantes into a cultural issue and responds by invoking the
vision of the literary imagination. When Edwards complains about the
lack of ethical training in the law academy,85 White blames it on a tun
nel-vision devotion to teaching the practical skills of mechanical juris
prudence (p. 45). The solution is cultural; ethics comes from the holis
tic inspiration of the transformative effects of the literary imagination,
which induces respect for others and for what lawyers and judges do.
Law school should teach "responsibility for the operations of one's
own mind, and for the judgments one reaches; responsibility to the law
itself' (p. 47).
The inclusive range of a holistic education is not unlimited and un
conditional. While White would tolerate the participation of the social
sciences, they embrace "tendencies of a different kind" (p. 51), that
threaten the academy. Because of the seriousness of the threat which we can assume comes principally from Posner and the law and
economics gang - he advocates a more vigorous defense against the
"tendencies of a different kind" than is presently being displayed. "It
is possible that the defense will fail, and law as we know it will disap
pear, which I would regard as a tragedy beyond contemplation" (p.
51).
White thus uses the literary imagination to cast law and economics
as a threat to convert legal education into a monster of objectivity, in-

84. Id. at 49.
85. See id.

at 38,

66-74.
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dividualism, and efficiency. Posner and his Chicago coterie are con
spiring to bring a Hunger Artist ethos to One L.86 Like Robin West,
White sees a Kafka metamorphosis in every classroom, morphing stu
dents into Ivan Boeskys.87 There is a threat, but it comes from the
balkanization of legal education into a law versus banana squabble be
tween the traditionalists and younger Tenured Radicals. Here is more
of Kahn's ubiquitous irony: as proponents of banana disciplines,
White and Posner are bound together in a common cause of survival.
It was Posner as professor who broke the door down for the accep
tance of bananas. While there had been modest cross-fertilization
with the social sciences, the appearance of law and economics sparked
a revolution. An article in the Wall Street Journal reported it as "the
most important thing in legal education since the birth of Harvard
Law School."88 As a progeny of the Chicago School of Economics,
and with the sponsorship of the University of Chicago Law School, the
movement overcame strong opposition to become a curricular fixture.
The long-range consequence is that Posner and his zealous followers
made all bananas respectable, prompting the New York Times to ask:

What do Law Schools Teach? Almost Anything.89
Edwards does not advocate the total exclusion of theory; rather he
concedes that, in moderation, exposure to nonlaw fields could provide
valuable insights. To him, the threat comes from volume; the weight
of the banana invasion has converted the curriculum into a graduate
school of social science and humanities.90 In a 1998 essay Peter H.
Schuck of Yale Law School agreed with Edwards on the split between
practice and education but discounted its effects. "It poses no serious
problems ... and it can be reduced but never bridged completely,
which in my view is fortunate for both sides."91 For support, he cites a
study purporting to show no significant change in the quality and
quantity of doctrinal scholarship from 1960 to 1985.92

86. Scorr TuROW, ONE L (1977) (providing a diary of the author's first year at Harvard
Law School).
87. Boesky was a Wall Street takeover expert caught and sentenced for using inside in
formation who reportedly said: "Greed is healthy. You can be greedy and still feel good
about yourself." See An Insider Goes Inside, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1987, at A22.
88. Charles Barrett, A Movement Called "Law and Economics" Sways Legal Circles,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 1 (quoting Bruce A. Ackerman).
89. Rothfeld, supra note 40.
90. See Edwards, supra note 5, at 35-41, 47-57.
91. Peter H. Schuck, The Profession and the Professors, AM. LAWYER, July/August.
1998, at 85, 86.
92 See id. Schuck does not identify the study. I suspect it was Michael J. Saks et al., Is
There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?: A Systematic
Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK L. REV. 353 (1996),
that surveyed articles from 1960 to 1985. For a study demonstrating "that modem legal
scholarship is losing touch with the practice of law," see Michael D. McClintock, The De-
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It is not that his data is flawed - it is simply dated and therefore
irrelevant. An economist would call it a case of "creative destruction":
it was not until the mid- to late 1980s that the postmodern movement
tripped in with sufficient influence to "creatively" usurp control of the
legal education market from the liberals. Roll Over Beethoven,93 the
Crit manifesto, was published in 1984, and storytelling, the Critical
Race trademark, got a jump Start in 1989 from a Michigan Law Review
symposium,94 while the Harvard Law Review published Frug's post
modern manifesto in 1992.95 Law school catalogues began to resemble
an undergraduate course menu inspired and taught by an expanding
collection of nonlaw doctorate faculty who came on board during the
mid-eighties. Schuck notes that Yale has about 15 nonlaw Ph.Ds.96
My school has dual appointments in history, medicine, economics, and
political science.
What happens when postmodern scholarship gets to the Promotion
and Tenure Committee is a topic of some bewilderment. Rather than
delaying nontraditional writing until they get tenure with obligatory
doctrinal work, young faculty now want to get an early start on a
postmodern career. There is a catch - how does the Committee pro
ceed? What do they use for evaluative criteria? If they thought criti
cal evaluation of doctrinal work was problematic, wait till they deal
with narratives and other postmodern genres.97 Instead of trying to
determine whether the article adds to the knowledge of the field, the
evaluator can look for its transformative effects on the audience. The
question is not whether the work solves a problem, but rather: Does it
resonate? It is not the comprehensibility of the analysis and research
but whether the author manifests a commitment to an oppressed
group. The burden is on the evaluator "to discern the unifying threads
of a nonlinear argument."98 Confronted with this formidable chal
lenge, the prudent committee will opt to rely on "those they recognize
as experts in the genre for theO assessment."99

dining Use ofLegal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51
(1998).

OKLA. L. REV. 659, 688

93. Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 20.
94. Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2rJ/3 (1989).
95. Frug, supra note 28.
96. See Schuck, supra note 91, at 86.
97. For a discussion of scholarship evaluation see Stephen L. Carter, Academic Tenure
and "White Male" Standards: Some Lessons from the Patent Law, 100 YALE LJ. 2065
(1991); Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, BO
CAL. L. REV. 889 (1992).
98. Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call ofStories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 1042 (1991).
99. Mary I. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO. L.

REV. 683, 709 (1992) (footnote omitted).
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The process could lead to some mean-spirited academic infighting
when the full faculty gathers to make hiring and promotion decisions.
The law core people - the liberals - can be expected to protect their
turf from further erosion in a replay of Edwards versus White. To
practical scholars, like Edwards, the inability to evaluate banana
scholarship justifies rationing that participation in the academy.100
Things could get worse when it is banana versus banana in a struggle
for preference. The only criteria for comparison are in the subjective
judgments of the respective proponents, opening up the prospect of ad
hominem attacks or arguments over the comparable merits of teaching
equilibrium theory, Billy

Budd, or C. Wright Mills.

"CONSCIOUSNESS III IS DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF LOGIC, RATIONALITY,
ANALYSIS, AND OF PRINCIPLES." 101

I first encountered postmodernism in 1970 in

The Greening of

America.

Charles Reich, a young law professor, wrote it during en
counters with students in the dining halls at Yale. In the style we now
know as postmodern pomobabble,102 Reich exhorted the '70s youth to
reject the liberal establishment, something he called the Corporate
State, which he held responsible for the evils of technology, rational
ity, meritocracy, and the hierarchical authority of education, creating
the "worst of all possible worlds."103 The salvation was Consciousness
III: a "way of life . . . . It is the energy of enthusiasm, of happiness, of
hope."104
Like Reich, Kahn and White are after the same Corporate State
culprits. The law hierarchy uses the coercive authority of rationality
to oppress the self by denying the presence of plurality, fragmentation,
and indeterminacy. For Kahn, Consciousness III is the cultural in
quiry which puts space between the Ideal Scholar and the logic of law.
"The real stakes in scholarship are not over the reform of law, but the
character of the scholar" (p. 137).
When asked by an Ideal Reader to rate the living novelists,
William Faulkner startled everyone by putting Tom Wolfe first followed by himself, Dos Passos, Hemingway, and Steinbeck. Why
Wolfe? He explained that the ranking was based on "the splendor of
our failure . . . . he failed the best because he had tried the hardest, he

100. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession: A Postscript, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2191, 2218 (1993) .
101.

CHARLES A. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA 25 6 (1970) .

102 See Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional
"Meaning" for the Uninitiated, 96 MICH. L. REV. 461 (1997).
103. REICH, supra note 101, at 110.
104. Id. at 234.
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had taken the longest gambles, taken the longest shots."105 And so it is
with Professor Kahn; his lofty aspirations are beyond anyone but Paul
Kahn.
On a practical level there are formidable barriers to Kahn's proj
ect. Reform scholarship is what law academics do; it is their calling
and their substance. We like writing about law; there is something for
everyone - advocacy, thought pieces, problem solving, trashing for
the mean spirited, and so on. Even shirkers like the reform model;
when pressured by deans for a publication, they know they can easily
turn off the heat with a quickie. There is, however, a more serious
predicament: Just what is a cultural inquiry? Where does reform
scholarship stop and the Ideal Scholar take over? "Genealogy," "ar
chitecture," and "methodological rules" work for Kahn but are too
rarefied for general consumption. It may be that Kahn is the first and last - Ideal Scholar.
White includes law and economics as a coconspirator in the
Corporate State, while exercising considerable hostility towards
Posner, whom he accuses of treating language as "scientific and
economic in character,"106 resulting in "lapses of taste and judgment"107
in reading texts. White's From Expectation to Experience is the
literary imagination tracking Reich's Consciousness Ill's praise of
nonlinear thought, the "spontaneous" and "disconnected,"103 as the
Ideal Reader looks for contingency and engagement in literature.
As part of the postmodern movement, law and literature and
White have bright futures. White knows how to push the right buttons
and has an obvious affinity for building an interest in textual explora
tion. Competing in a declining buyer's market, law schools seek to dif
ferentiate their school from the competition. Offering nontraditional
bananas has become the favorite product differentiation tactic, assur
ing a fertile life for White and his literary imagination.

105. FAULKNER IN THE UNIVERSITY, supra note 52, at 206.
106. White, supra note 62, at 2015.
107. Id. at 2027 n.40.
108. REICH, supra note 101, at 257.

